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Introduction: The Historical 
Context
The Libyan revolution of 17 February 2011 resulted in a United Nations 
mandated NATO air campaign in March 2011, and the death of Colonel 
Muammar Gaddafi at the hands of rebel fighters 20 October 2011. Almost 
two years after the February 17 Revolution began, the transition to democracy 
remains a fragile process.
The transitional process can only be understood in the context of the heavy 
legacy of Colonel Gaddafi’s dictatorial and totalitarian rule. For four decades 
Gaddafi’s regime maintained a monopoly on political and economic power 
in Libya. Civil and political rights and rights of association were highly 
restricted. In addition, media was under the control of the government.2  The 
result was chronic underdevelopment and mismanagement of the country’s 
institutions.
In contrast to Egypt and Tunisia, the revolution in Libya took the form of a 
major internal conflict resulting in on-going consequences for Libyan security. 
The National Transitional Council (NTC)—formed on 5 March 2011 in the 
city of Benghazi3—failed to disarm rebel groups once fighting had ceased. 
The NTC handed power to the General National Congress in August 2012. 
2. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Libya. Retrieved online 03/12/12: http://
carnegieendowment.org/2010/12/17/libya/1shh accessed 03/12/12
3. The website of the transitional council http://www.ntclibya.org/english/
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The first free elections in decades that took place in July 2012 saw liberal, 
secular and independent candidates outflank the Muslim-Brotherhood-
aligned Justice and Construction Party. The liberal National Forces Alliance 
party won with 48% of the vote (39 seats), with the Islamist Justice and 
Construction party coming second with 10% (17 seats). Independent 
candidates won 120 seats, reflecting the importance of regional politics. 
Mr Ali Zidan was elected by the parliament as prime minister in October 
2012. His predecessor, Mustafa Abu Shagur, had failed in two attempts 
to form a government acceptable to Congress. The interim government is 
formed of a mixture of liberal figures and Islamists and also aims to strike 
a balance between Libya’s various regions. It was officially inaugurated in 
November 2012. 
The government is facing a major change; that of asserting the new state’s 
authority in face of the growing hegemony of diverse armed factions in Libya’s 
post-Gaddafi. These decentralised armed groups are the greatest threat to 
Libya’s recovery. The killing of US ambassador Christopher Stevens in an 
attack against the American consulate in Benghazi by Islamist gunmen was a 
major setback for the transitional authorities and reveals its shortcoming in 
dealing with the security challenge.4 The result is widespread insecurity and 
stalled economic recovery.
The Libyan government’s quest for justice has focussed on the cases of Saif 
al-Islam Gaddafi (son of Colonel Gaddafi) and Abdullah Senussi, both of 
whom are facing arrest warrants from the International Criminal Court for 
alleged crimes against humanity. The Libyan government is still refusing to 
hand over Gaddafi’s son arguing that he should be tried before the national 
legal system.5 While these are high profile and nationally significant cases, 
4. See http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/09/12/uk-libya-usa-attack-idUKBRE88B0ED2012
0912
5. CNN, Libya challenges International Criminal Court’s order to hand over Saif Gaddafi, 
09/10/12. Retrieved on 18/12/12.
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the government has not yet proposed a comprehensive transitional justice 
strategy for the country. 
The adoption of the so-called political isolation bill incited further internal 
divisions and occurred under the pressure of militias who mounted a siege 
of governmental buildings in Tripoli. The bill is meant to prevent officials 
who worked under the former Gaddafi-era government from participating 
in politics. There are worries that this bill will over-reach its mandate and 
will be used for account settlements.6 There are fears that this bill will also 
contribute to the exclusion of endemic lack of skills in the country.  
Moreover, the growing tribal tension is hindering the national reconciliation. 
In a country that lived for years without any political dynamics, tribes replaced 
the political arena manipulated by the regime. This situation confirms the 
primacy of a national reconciliation plan able to help Libyans close the 
chapter of the Gaddafi era and to successfully lead a peaceful state building 
process. 
Although national media is now free from the tight control of Gaddafi’s 
regime, Libyan media are still struggling to develop into a free and professional 
industry. Subject to the threat of armed groups, lack of professional structures, 
poor skills and the heavy legacy of the past, Libyan journalists have been 
reduced to the same self-censorship of the prior regime.7 
6. BBC, Why Libya’s militias are up in arms, 01/05/2013,  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
africa-22361101
7. This report was published in a smaller version by Carnegie International. See the report 
of Carnegie http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/05/14/transitional-libyan-media-free-at-
last/g3dk#
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CHAPTER 1 
Mainstream Libyan Media: 
From Gaddaﬁ ’s Propaganda 
to the Reconstruction Process
Under Gaddafi, the media was used solely to secure his own power. Content 
was highly politicised in favour of the regime and any criticism of Gaddafi 
would result in imprisonment or worse. The revolution saw an explosion of 
new private media while the old state media apparatus is struggling to cope 
with the transitional phase. According to Legatum Institute’s Libya Media 
Wiki there are currently at least 200 registered newspapers, 20 TV channels 
and 200 radio stations,10 though the volatile transitional phase makes it 
impossible to assess with accuracy the number of new media outlets. The 
lack of any law or emerging policy to organise this field also means it is ripe 
for libel, slanderous statements and unfounded accusations.
Historical Background
For much of its history, media in Libya has merely been an extension of state 
power. Under the pretence of reform, Gaddafi’s regime constructed—and 
when needed, reconstructed—media bureaucracies that were tightly bound 
to its own authority. 
10. See http://en.libyamediawiki.com/index.php?title=Main_Page
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After Gaddafi seized power in a coup in 1969, media content became highly 
politicised in support of the new regime. Nevertheless, despite the emergence 
of more politicised media content, it was under state control as set out in 
Gaddafi’s Green Book on political philosophy (published in 1975).11 This 
was achieved through linking all public organisations, including the media, 
to “People’s Committees.” According to the Green Book, government was 
society and, thus, these committees directly represented local or professional 
entities thereby establishing a direct popular democracy. Independent 
organisations, including those of the media, were seen as a threat to the 
government/society relationship: 
 “… the press is a means of expression of society and is not a means of expression 
of a natural or a corporate person. Logically and democratically, the press, 
therefore, cannot be owned by either of these.”12
In reality, Gaddafi loyalists were selected to run the People’s Committees, 
which were also frequently linked to the security apparatus.13 A complex 
system of patronage ensured loyalty to Gaddafi and his family. During 
the 1970s, broadcasting was organised by the state-run Libyan Jamahiriya 
Broadcasting (LJB). The government was the sole funder of the LJB and all 
advertising was banned. It had an explicitly political mandate, aiming to “…
stand against defamation campaigns and refute all fabrications about the 
LAR [Libyan Arab Jamarhiriya].”14
11. The Green Book is available in English at http://books.google.com (accessed September 
29, 2009). The website of the World Center for the Study and Research of the Green 
Book, an important Libyan institution, is available at www.greenbookstudies.com 
(accessed September 29, 2009).
12. Richter, Carola ‘Media and Journalism under Gaddafi: Al Jamahirya and other tools 
for revolutionary mobilization and national development.’ Retrieved from http://www.
reinventinglibya.org/mediaandjournalism.php accessed on 01/06/2012.
13. Internews, ‘Libya media assessment May/June 2011’ Accessed from www.internews.org 
retrieved 01/06/2012.
14. McDaniel, Drew, ‘Libya’ in Boyd, Douglas A., Broadcasting in the Arab World: A Survey 
of the Electronic Media of the Middle East, IOWA State University Press, 1999.
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The period of national media expansion during the late 1970s to mid-1980s 
ended with the economic turmoil of the late 1980s. The reduction in the 
global demand for oil and a massive increase in Libya’s defence spending 
(18% of GNP, proportionately one of the highest in the world at the time) 
saw a reduction in expenditure on public media. Plans for further expansion 
made in the 1970s never came to fruition.15 While the structures of media 
control were reorganised during this period, political considerations remained 
foremost in programming and content.16 While political freedom was absent, 
institutional capabilities had advanced. 
The economic sanctions of 1993, imposed on Libya by the UN following the 
Lockerbie Bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, damaged Libyan national media 
by preventing imports of computers and other technology. Newspapers 
suffered from a shortage of paper and the technological advances in television 
production were left behind by rapid technological and professional shifts 
occurring abroad.17 The space created by the sanctions inadvertently allowed 
Al Jazeera to gain dominance as the preferred channel for Libyan audiences. 
Libya’s own satellite channel Al Jamahirya was launched in 1996, but could 
not compete with the professionalism of the pan-Arabic satellite channels. 
The popularity of pan-Arab satellite television channels introduced a degree 
of information plurality, though the regime invested heavily in equipment 
to monitor satellite content and to jam satellite broadcasts.18 The regime 
encouraged local print and radio which “provided niches for Libyan 
journalists and intellectuals in the prevailing environment of ideological 
journalism.”19 They fashioned their small operations as instruments of 
intellectual development and cultural education. This non-political output 
15. McDaniel, Drew, ‘Libya’ in Boyd, Douglas A., Broadcasting in the Arab World: A Survey 
of the Electronic Media of the Middle East, IOWA State University Press, 1999.
16. McDaniel, Drew, ‘Libya’ in Boyd, Douglas A., Broadcasting in the Arab World: A Survey 
of the Electronic Media of the Middle East.
17. Ibid.
18 USAID Report pp. 8.
19. Richter, Carola ‘Media and Journalism under Gaddafi.’
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sidestepped the censorship of the political sections of the media.20 While the 
large state media operations focussed on international and national news 
of relevance to the regime, local newspapers became a breeding ground for 
more community-oriented journalism.21
The Internet was introduced to Libya in 2001 but only small clandestine 
media operations in the eastern part of Libya were able to bypass the state 
monopoly on Internet service providers (there was just one, Libya Telecom 
and Technology–LTT22).23 The use of new media, particularly in eastern 
Libya, was to expand rapidly in the wake of weakening territorial and political 
state power during the revolution. 
State Media: The Voice of Propaganda 
The press code of 1972 punished those who “tarnished the country’s 
reputation” with life imprisonment and prescribed the death sentence for 
anyone who “advocates inside Libya … theories or principles aiming to change 
the basic tenets of the national constitution or the basic structures of the 
social system, or aiming to overthrow the state’s political, social or economic 
structures.”24 The state media was controlled by a set of different organisms 
depending on the regime’s mood and willingness to relax its grip over media 
or strengthen it. The state media was put under the umbrella of the Ministry 
of Information in 1971 but this ministry was continuously reorganised and 
rebranded. For instance, the press publications were under the auspices of 
the Ministry of Interior in 1977. Later in 1979 the Ministry of Information 
was rebranded as a ‘secretariat’ for information and then for information 
and culture in 1988. The Jamahiriyya General Information Corporation was 
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. USAID Report pp. 9.
23. Richter, Carola ‘Media and Journalism under Gaddafi.’
24. http://en.libyamediawiki.com/index.php?title=Main_Page
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established in 2001 as an umbrella to gather all media outlets. Under its remit 
was the Jamahiriyya General Broadcasting Corporation (for audio-visual media) 
and the General Press Corporation (for print publications), as well as related 
industries (printing, distributing, documentation, music, publishing, etc.). 
The information ministry was again dismantled and the media was under 
the remit of the Ministry of Culture just before the revolution of 17 February 
2011. 
The creation of executive bodies to oversee and directly manage the media 
sector—such as the General Press Corporation (GPC) for print publications 
and the Jamahiriya Broadcasting Corporation (JBC) run by high security officials 
close to Gaddafi—was to assert media control and maintain subservience. 
The state media, considered as a tool for tawjih (or “regime orientation”), had 
no respect or credibility among the Libyan audiences; while rebels raged and 
the regime struggled to cling to power, state media was increasingly steadfast 
in its disinformation campaigns. State media, especially broadcast, became a 
platform for libel and slander to the extent of fabricating stories about alleged 
mass crimes and rape committed by the rebels. The battle within the hearts 
and minds of Libyans of whether to trust the state media or the regional 
Arab satellite TV stations was fierce. Some journalists interviewed disclosed 
knowledge of a special unit within the regime’s media apparatus tasked 
with providing regional TV stations, such as al-Arabiya and Al Jazeera, 
with erroneous reports. The purpose of this disinformation campaign was to 
discredit these particular media outlets—who frequently broadcasted these 
unconfirmed reports—in the eyes of Libyans. While it remains impossible to 
verify the authenticity of this information, it is nonetheless symbolic of the 
fierce media propaganda crucial for the regime’s survival. Thus the media 
war was part and parcel of the larger revolutionary war. 
Under the crisis, state media was rebranded again with talk show stars-turned-
pundits who used their positions to launch politically charged campaigns 
against dissidents. These media figures were largely unknown before the 
uprising but quickly rose to prominence as a result of their antics. The most 
prominent example is that of Hala al-Misrati, a TV presenter who drew a gun 
in the studio of al-Libyya TV and promised to fight till the end in defence 
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of the regime. She was also well known for her police-style investigative 
talks with imprisoned journalists who she commonly asked to declare their 
repentance.25
For Abdallah Rached, a former state media journalist, media control was key 
for the former regime’s survival. “The regime wanted to win the battle at any 
price. The media was more important than the field battle,” said Rached, who 
remained in his position in state media until the fall of the regime. However, 
he said, the state media performance was extremely weak and not able to 
face the main voice of the rebellion: powerful Arab satellite channels. While 
traditional media, especially TV stations, were the main propaganda tool for 
the regime under the crisis, social media was gaining traction with the so-
called “Libyan electronic army” campaign. (It is important to note that the 
Facebook page of this social media “army” is still live with calls for revenge 
for the “martyr leader Gaddafi.”26
The state media employed approximately 5,000 employees most of whom 
were technicians and administrative staff. Journalists amounted to less than 
half the administrative staff, an endemic problem that remains one of the 
major challenges to the media reconstruction process. State media had no real 
political function other than to publish information about activities provided 
by the regime itself as well as its interpretation of international news. The 
monopoly of the Jamahiriyya National News Agency (JANA) over the political 
news meant that the regime was able to continuously control the content of 
state media. The four state press main publications (al Jamahiriyya, El shams, el 
Zahf al Akhdar and el Fajr el Jadid) had minute differences because headlines, 
editorials and political news were simply provided by the national news 
agency. While the format of the “news” was extremely redundant—lengthy 
prose in praise of the regime interspersed with insults to its opponents—there 
was more room to manoeuvre when tackling socio-economic or cultural 
topics, especially in the latter years of the Gaddafi regime. Many journalists 
interviewed talked about encouragement from avant-gardist editors-in-
25. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wk4wlP04Sdk
26. http://www.facebook.com/libyan.Electronic.army2
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chief who offered them opportunities for advancement, which meant field 
reporting on domestic issues and the ability to question the performance of 
some ministries. Since broadcast media was under tighter state control, this 
was mainly left to print publications whose reports—depending on access 
granted by the regime—could range from questioning the performance of the 
minister or another high official to critiquing the shortcomings of the public 
administration.
State media management was equally volatile. Since self-censorship was 
entrenched in the daily practices and news production of journalists, they 
were not subjected to managerial scrutiny. However, depending on the 
interpretation given by the regime’s officials, some news production could 
be considered a breach of state imperatives. During the uprising, state media 
had clear directives for journalists: protesters were to be labelled as thugs 
or the vestiges of al-Qaeda; there were to be no anger protests but rather 
support demonstrations; and members of the general public were to be 
supportive of their leader.27 The limited number of media outlets and the 
continuous change in structure led to a situation where journalists moved 
from one position to another within the same media apparatus. Sometimes, 
this change was in fact punishment for the journalist’s misbehaviour. The 
performance of the media outlet was also dependent upon the management 
style the regime opted for in different phases. 
“Even the critical tone of some publications was dictated by the regime 
who was designing roles for each media outlet. We were encouraged to 
cause trouble from inside the regime, but only under their directives. At 
al-Jamahiriyya, we tried to avoid problematic issues so we decided not to 
publish news on the front page—only headlines and a caricature. We did 
not have a large enough margin for error. However, it was not all about 
flattering Gaddafi. For instance, we had six supplements. The cultural 
supplement was not subject to censorship.” 
—Abdel Razzak Dahesh, 
former editor-in-chief of al-Jamahiriyya newspaper
27. Interview Abdel RazzakDahesh, Tripoli, October 2012.
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“I managed to implement many reforms especially in providing these media 
outlets with new equipment. The content was always restricted. The main 
problem of the Libyan media is that it was limited to local staff and did not 
benefit from Arab media expertise. This led to a situation where Libyan 
media were completely excluded from the Arab media environment.”
—Mohamed Baio, former head of the General Press Corporation
“When I tackled the issue of the Amazigh28 language in my programme, 
a topic considered taboo, I was arrested for a day. I was later told that 
the segments I produced about this language caused the anger of Gaddafi 
himself. I later received a letter of termination from my job and was put 
under a freelancing system.”
—Mahmood Sharkazy, TV anchor at al-Assema TV station 
“We used to receive phone calls after the publication. For example, I wrote a 
report on Christmas in Tripoli. After publication, the editor received phone 
calls arguing that we are a Muslim country and there is no Christmas or 
Santa for us. We were asked to publish another report saying that people 
in Tripoli are anti-Christmas. We were astonished, but we had to do so.”
—Warda Mohamed, journalist at Libya state-funded newspaper 
Journalists of the former state media acknowledge two positive elements 
from their experiences: working in a disciplined environment with clearly 
defined expectations and their exposure to the international media and Arab 
satellite TV channels. In the latest years of the regime, state media were 
finally provided with subscriptions to international news agencies. Although 
oppressive, former state media seemed to offer a secure work environment 
for journalists as opposed to the chaotic transitional media institutions. The 
months preceding the outbreak of the revolution witnessed an unprecedented 
28. Libya’s Amazigh consider themselves the original Libyans and they suffered decades of 
repression and discrimination at the hands of the Gaddafi regime, Please refer to http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16289543
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opening up in which state media tackled otherwise forbidden topics. The 
pressure of the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings pushed the regime to release 
its stranglehold on the media sector in a desperate move to preserve its image. 
This short phase is remembered by some journalists as a “golden phase.” 
It soon vanished during the revolution as state media was propagated for 
political redemption. 
“I greatly enjoyed the two months that preceded the revolution as we 
had a unique margin of freedom, thanks to the particular conditions of 
revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt. We could talk about cartoon films, 
violence, graffiti on walls, the meaning of citizenship and the conditions of 
student campuses. All these were taboo topics. For instance, the conditions 
of students’ campuses were extremely poor as it was the main bastion for 
political opposition. We still faced internal struggles but this was a golden 
phase, better than the current situation now after the revolution.”
—Mariam al-Hajjaji, head of FM radio al-Libiyya
Saif Al-Islam Media Reform: Too Good to Be True?
Under international pressure, the regime allowed a carefully controlled 
opening up of the country’s media. This coincided with the end of the UN 
sanctions in 2003 and the so-called “normalisation” of diplomatic relations 
with the UK and the US. Economically, Gaddafi had begun to adopt the 
limited top-down liberalisation seen earlier in other Arab dictatorships 
such as Egypt. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch visited 
the country officially for the first time in 2004 and 2005 respectively. After 
20 years of refused entry, Reporters Without Borders was able to interview 
dissident journalists in Libya in 2006.29
29. Reporters Without Borders, International Secretariat, ‘The Birth of “Free Media” in 
Eastern Libya’, Report directed by ServaneViguier in Benghazi and Tobrouk, April 2011.
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Saif al-Islam Gaddafi’s 2006 criticism of the lack of press freedom in the 
country was particularly striking.30 Established by Saif, Al-Ghad Group for 
media services was one of the main fruits of the liberalisation process initiated 
by Gaddafi’s son. Launched in the mid-2000s, the al-Ghad media Group was 
a window to new opportunity for Libyan journalists. Willing to rebrand the 
face of the regime and to attract his opponents in the cadre of an alleged 
state reform initiative, Saif launched an ambitious media project composed 
of a main TV channel (al-Libiyya), two newspapers (Oea (oealibya.com) and 
Quryna (quryna.com)) and a news agency (Libya Press). The project provided 
its journalists with a much more open window where censorship was limited 
to the person of Gaddafi. This project came as part of a general reform plan 
in which the regime could finally engage its main opponent, the Muslim 
Brotherhood. In a 2006 speech, Saif identified four issues that could not be 
discussed: Islamism, the “security and stability of Libya,”31 Libya’s “territorial 
integrity”32 and finally, Muammar Gaddafi himself .33 All other areas were 
no longer immune to criticism. Coinciding with the Al-Ghad media project 
was the launch of local newspapers and radios and the appearance of foreign 
press in news-stands after a 25-year ban. Three foreign news agencies opened 
offices in Tripoli.34
However, the media’s newfound bravery was short-lived. After only a few 
years, it buckled under the pressure of internal battles between the old and 
new guards. The main flagship channel of the project—al Libiyya TV—
was suddenly shut down in 2009 after it aired a programme featuring a 
30. Reuters, Special Report: How Gaddafi scion went from reformer to reactionary, 11/04/12.
Retrieved online 19/12/12 http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/11/us-libya-saif-idUS
BRE83A0DL20120411
31. Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi, speech given at the Second Meeting of the Youth of Benghazi, 
Benghazi, August 20, 2007, http://gdf.org.ly/index.php?lang=en&CAT_NO=114&
MAIN_CAT_NO=9&Page=105&DATA_NO=252 (accessed August 15, 2009).
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
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controversial Egyptian journalist. The publication by Libya Press news agency 
of an article criticising the old guard caused the immediate dismantling of 
this service as well as the arrest of several journalists. The newspaper Oea,35 
which shut down after it published an article calling for the return of a 
prominent Libyan dissident,36 re-opened in 2010 under the name of Sabah 
Oea (“the Day of Oea”) and pledged allegiance to Gaddafi. The al-Libiya 
flagship channel was re-branded as al-Jamahiriyya 2, its freedom drastically cut 
and the channel used as the regime’s main propaganda machine during the 
revolution. Saif Gaddafi proved unable to protect this young media project 
which witnessed a continuous re-branding and change of management that 
finally transformed it into a new version of the old-fashioned state media. 
Although disappointing in its outcome, the al-Ghad media project is still 
considered by most journalists I interviewed within this field investigation a 
rare opportunity to experience first-hand professional journalism. 
For Mahmoud Misrati, editor-in-chief of Libya al Jadida newspaper (currently 
gaining popularity in Tripoli), his work as a reporter for Oea newspaper was 
his first real experience of journalism. “We stopped using redundant discourse in 
storytelling; the format of the publication was really newsy,” he said. “We could do 
investigative work with relation to people’s daily problems and polemic topics such 
as corruption and the high prices for goods.” This opinion is not shared by all. 
Mohamed Baio, who held several high-level positions within the state media 
including a recent stint as head of the GPC, is not convinced. For him, the 
al-Ghad experience was all show. “They took the best of Libyan talents, but the 
change was restricted to the form and not the content,” he said. “This project was 
a bubble that finally exploded.” 
35. http://www.moheet.com/2010/11/12/%D8%B5%D8%AD%D9%8A%D9%81%
D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%
D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF-
%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B8%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%A5%
D8%B3%D9%85-%D8%AC%D8%AF/
36. http://www.rnw.nl/arabic/article/middle-east04112010
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If the political content remained stagnant, the editorial style used by the 
media project was a complete departure from the old-fashioned state media 
style. Although largely cosmetic, this in itself was a major change in the 
national media industry. The training opportunities offered to journalists as 
part of this project were the only channels through which they could build 
upon their core competencies. The relative openness of al-Ghad media outlets 
encouraged state media to push the boundaries of what was permissible. 
“We would not be able to run media outlets today without the experience of 
al-Ghad project. We had proper training then and we learned for the first 
time about something called professional skills.”
—Mahmood al-Sharkasy, talk show host, al-Assema TV station 
“I joined the Libya Press team and trained in news writing. While the 
national news agency was very poor in quality, we were closer to people’s 
problems—to the street. We were trained by Libyan journalists who used 
to work for Al Jazeera. We had the pulse of the street [and] we could 
experience investigative journalism, but we also had many limitations. 
Libya Press was not providing any news on Gaddafi’s activities. We left 
this for the national news agency (JANA).”
—Rana al-Akabani, former journalist at Libya Press news agency 
The Reconstruction Process: Heading to the Unknown
Amid strong opposition, the Libyan parliament voted recently for the re-
establishment of a ministry of information to deal mainly with the legacy 
of the former regime and especially to put some order in a chaotic sector.37 
The fears are from the possibility of re-establishing a state-controlled media 
which, with the heavy legacy of the former regime, would stifle freedom 
37. http://www.libyaherald.com/2012/11/26/national-congress-votes-to-create-new-
ministry-of-information/
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of expression. The transitional bodies established after the revolution to 
reorganise the media sector took radical measures with regard to the state 
media legacy, thus establishing a complete rupture with the past. After the 
revolution the transitional power nominated a media minister, Mahmood 
Shammam,38 an opposition figure who lived in the US for many years. Media 
was later put under the umbrella of the Ministry of Culture and Civil Society. 
The Committee for Supporting and Encouraging the Press (CESP), formed 
in the aftermath of the regime’s fall, took the decision to dismantle the state’s 
main newspapers and to publish new ones in order to sustain employment 
(around 1,200 staff, most of whom are technical and administrative). 
Questions remain as to how to properly manage the media transition. For 
example, should the legacy of the state media be preserved? Is there any 
possible function for state media in the post-Gaddafi regime? How can 
the topic of state media inefficiency—such as employee redundancy, poor 
training and lack of leadership—be broached? 
It is clear that transitional bodies had no vision of how to deal with these 
issues and did not have sufficient power to implement the few decisions 
they did make. There is a general perception that state media has no raison 
d’être in post-Gaddafi Libya, a sentiment shared by those who used to lead 
the media industry. There were discussions about transforming the old 
state media into a provider of public service following the example of the 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), especially in the first months of the 
transition. This vision is now less appealing given the poor conditions of the 
former state media and the growing trends of encouraging private media. 
However, the decision to dismantle the former state newspapers is viewed 
by former state journalists as punishment for their complicity. For most of 
them, they lost their media headquarters as a result of NATO air strikes. 
Although the transitional body tasked with managing the legacy of the old 
state newspapers chose to rent new offices, the limited space of these new 
headquarters and their inadequacy to provide proper newsroom facilities is 
aggravating the problems of the new state-funded newspapers.
38. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/11/201111221259638191.html; see also 
http://www.rfi.fr/emission/20120707-mahmoud-shammam-ex-ministre-patron-presse
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According to the “Decision Seven” issued by the transitional government’s 
Ministry of Culture, the new state media apparatus will be limited to only one 
state TV station, one radio station and one newspaper.39 However it is still 
unclear which media are considered “state media” and, most importantly, 
what role they will play. The newly founded newspapers that replaced the 
former state media apparatus were created by the Committee for Supporting 
and Encouraging the Press without any clear criteria and without sufficient 
resources. Staff of these new publications are a mixture of citizen journalists 
and former low-level state media journalists. The identity of these new 
newspapers—funded by the state but without editorial control—is unclear 
and its future uncertain. Their content is still far from professional and 
they are frequently accused of replicating practices of the old state media 
by flattering figures of the new regime. The daily Febrayer newspaper40 
(in allusion to February, the month of the outbreak of the revolution) is 
considered as the new state newspaper. Its editorial quality is low and heavy 
criticism has led to calls for its closure/re-branding. Another state-funded 
weekly (al-Masar) recently halted publication after its editor-in-chief was 
accused of supporting the former regime. Another state-funded weekly (al-
Bilad al Aan) is employing staff from the former state media who did not have 
managerial positions in an attempt to reintegrate them. The sustainability 
of all these publications is questionable. The future of these publications is 
uncertain; they are loose in structure, understaffed, face limited funding from 
the Committee and lack real vision and planning from project initiators. 
“I am sure that establishing a new state media system in Libya is impossible. 
The staff and capacities are so poor. We need years and years of training 
and support to be able to deliver professional journalism.”
—Mohamed Baio, former head of General Press Corporation
39. http://www.reinventinglibya.org/lnmu.php
40. http://www.febpress.ly/
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“I don’t believe in state media today. If they will allow state-funded media 
to be critical of the government, what will be the difference between these 
newspapers and the private ones?”
—Abdel Razzak Dahesh, 
former editor-in-chief of al-Jamahiriyya newspaper
According to the head of the Committee of Supporting and Encouraging the 
Press, the aim of these new newspapers is to provide a new work structure for 
the former state media staff as well as to encourage state-funded publications 
in the outlying regions. However, these new fragile newspapers are not able 
to attract the former state journalists who simply refused to return to work 
while still earning wages. According to the head of the committee Idris al-
Mismari, “journalists returned to work according to personal decisions. I 
cannot force people to go back to work, although this situation is causing us a 
huge problem. This is a transitional phase and we don’t want to cause anyone 
harm. In Libya, a salary is considered a right to the person and their family 
especially in this sensitive period. We don’t want to create animosities.” His 
plan is to incrementally integrate the former state media into the private 
media so as to gradually phase out state media. For encouraging this process, 
private newspapers are “offered” staff whose wages will continue to be paid by 
the state as well as equipment and publishing facilities in return for sharing 
some advertisement revenues with the Committee. The long term goal is 
that these private newspapers will manage to assume complete responsibility 
for their staff. It is not clear if this plan could pan out but the Committee is 
actively signing agreements with a variety of new private publications. 
If transitional entities managed to take some decision with regard to state-fund-
ed print media, the situation of broadcast state media remains opaque. Most 
of the old state TV and radio stations are not back to business controlled by 
factions and armed militias. For instance the flagship al-Libiyya TV channel 
was renamed as Libya station by the Ministry of Culture, opting for it to be the 
only official TV station. However the station characterised by its high techno-
logical capacities is proving the most problematic case of this media transition. 
Due to managerial problems and a power struggle over controlling its assets, it 
is now only broadcasting old documentaries and revolutionary songs. 
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The power struggle over controlling former TV and radio stations is hindering 
its revitalisation. For instance, the former al-Jamahiriyya TV station, which 
was the first TV station under Gaddafi, witnessed fierce battles over 
controlling its staff and its logo. According to Ali Mohamed Salem, head of 
the TV station’s news services, the transitional government tried to impose 
new management which was counteracted by staff strikes and sit-ins. The 
station finally imposed itself as the main state TV—although, by law, it is not 
any longer—and refused to give this role to the former al-Libiya TV station, 
which is struggling to keep afloat. The government in the end accepted this de 
facto situation, providing the al Wataniya TV station with exclusive rights to 
cover official events. Like other state TV and radio stations its management 
is continuously in flux due to internal decisions taken by the remaining staff 
and power exercised by its guards, most of whom are former rebels.
“Our newspapers today are still the same as what they used to be under 
the former regime. The same news is published by all publications without 
any change. Journalists are used to copy/paste statements from sources. 
Sometimes I find myself forced to express my opinion on the quality of the 
production and to intervene with management.”
—Idriss el Mismari, head of the Committee 
for Supporting and Encouraging the Press
“Our newspaper was established to be the voice of the revolution. This 
phase has now ended. This newspaper should be transformed into a real 
professional newspaper. For this, we need professional staff, real journalists, 
a disciplined internal structure and to acquire more courage in tackling 
topics in relation to people’s problems. The newspaper needs a complete 
re-invention. I believe that starting fresh could be less hectic than fixing a 
problematic structure.” 
—Ahmed al Ghomari, managing editor, Febrayer newspaper 
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Regulation and Journalists’ Unions
Although national laws under Gaddafi provided for freedom of speech 
and of the press within the confines of the principles of the revolution, the 
media production was in practice under the tight control of the government 
and the security apparatus. A set of oppressive rules in the press codes was 
frequently used for the imprisonment of journalists who could even face 
the death penalty. The press avoids publishing any material that could be 
deemed offensive or threatening, particularly to Islam, national security, 
territorial integrity or Gaddafi.41 However the description by journalists of 
their media practices demonstrates that laws had less impact on them than 
self-censorship, regime control and security bodies in frequently interrogating 
and arresting journalists. Another tool was to remove a journalist from their 
position or stop them from producing, or to assign them to a less important 
role or even a different industry.
After the fall of the regime, Article 14 of the Interim Constitutional 
Declaration guaranteed freedom of expression and freedom of the press. 
The Declaration repealed laws restricting freedom of the press, speech and 
expression until such a government was in place to enact a new legislative 
framework. As extensive media legislation is still lacking, existing libel and 
defamation laws allow people the right to take up civil claims. 
Media regulation was and still is a major question in the process of reorganising 
the media sector. While the transitional power could not agree on the 
authority who would take charge of media reorganisation, it seems that the 
new government is more inclined to reinstate a ministry of information. Before 
the revolution, the Ministry of Information was abolished and media was put 
under the umbrella of the Ministry of Culture. However, the NTC chose to 
appoint a “minister” for media in its executive board immediately after its 
formation. When the transitional government was formed in late November 
2011, it decided to put the media sector again under the umbrella of the 
41. See http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2009/libya
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Ministry of Culture and Civil Society. Vague plans for the establishment of a 
media council to oversee the media sector without executive powers are still 
struggling to materialise. 
The media sector was again reorganised, mainly with the issuance of Decree 
44 (May 2012) establishing a High Media Council which would report 
directly to the NTC and which will be responsible for overseeing the media 
sector. This body is to be tasked with reorganising Libya’s media sector with 
substantial functions such as formulating regulations and laws for media, 
adopting a code of ethics and granting necessary licences for various media 
groups.42 This body was provided authority over the assets of state media, 
print and broadcast and all media centres in and outside the country. This 
reorientation was met with heavy criticism. For example the members of 
the High Council were chosen by official nomination. This situation led to 
the suspension of the decisions related to the High Media Council until the 
conclusion of the elections of the General National Congress.43
Discussions around the model for reorganising the media sector were and 
still are very much focussed on the idea of establishing a High Media Council 
to oversee the sector in lieu of a ministry of information with executive 
powers. Those who support this idea believe that nominating a minister for 
information will lead undoubtedly to the return of a hegemonic government 
with deep implications for independent media. However, the High Media 
Council itself became subject to a power struggle. Under the former regime, 
journalists’ unions were permitted under the banner of “association” which 
limited their function to that of a social club. A conference in Jadu in the 
Nafusa mountains in June 2012, the third in a series of journalist gatherings 
previously held in Tripoli in January 2012 and Benghazi in May 2012,44 
resulted in a second High Media Council elected—though this time by 
journalists. With 21 elected members this media council sparked a new wave 
42. http://en.libyamediawiki.com/index.php?title=Decree_number_44
43. http://en.libyamediawiki.com/index.php?title=Letter_Ref:_497/2012
44. http://en.libyamediawiki.com/index.php?title=Media_Policy#Minister_of_Media
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of criticism, mainly for the fact that the body that elected it was formed largely 
of citizen journalists and technicians rather than clearly defined professional 
“journalists.”
Although the NTC endorsed this new body by issuing Decree 62 (July 2012), 
it confirmed at the same time its transitional role “until the General National 
Congress assumes its duties and responsibilities and takes the actions it deems 
necessary thereof.”45 The struggle between these two bodies both claiming to 
represent journalists led to a situation where the media community is further 
divided and voices are urging an information ministry to clean up the mess. 
Chapter Recommendations 
 It is crucial that the media community finds its way to elect representative 
bodies. These bodies would be tasked with defining the role of a 
professional journalist, issuing press cards, launching debates on ethical 
codes, lobbying for better work conditions and salaries for journalists 
among other tasks.
 There is a crucial need for a specialised body to be granted executive 
power so that they may take charge of the reorganisation of the former 
state media and the drafting of laws for the private sector. This body 
should not be elected but rather seek nominees among those who have 
both the international expertise and the knowledge of the local media 
industry. An electoral process would not guarantee the chosen members 
will be apt to lead this operation. 
 It is imperative for the Libyan national media industry to learn from the 
experiences of transitional countries and expert opinion. Isolationism 
from regional and international environments means Libya and its media 
sector suffered tremendously. The transitional phase is an occasion for 
the Libyan media industry to benefit from external critique. 
45. http://en.libyamediawiki.com/index.php?title=Decree_Number_62
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 The drastic measures taken by the transitional bodies with regard to the 
former state media are perceived as punishment to the sector and serve as 
a rupture between the past and the present. Re-integrating former state 
media staff is a must especially with the acute lack of skills and leadership 
within the national media community. 
 Rethinking the role of state media instruments is more than crucial. 
Managerial and editorial decisions should not be random decisions 
based on personal moods but according to a planned vision based on 
needs and possibility for development. Although the state media sector 
was manipulated by the former regime for many years, this sector could 
still develop into a public service provider on condition of adequate 
organisation, regulation and training.
 The continuous changes witnessed by the former state media sector 
under the transition exacerbated its problems and provided its journalists 
with a volatile and non-secure work environment. It is crucial that the 
new government adopt a consistent policy based on long-term vision and 
clearly defined roles and responsibilities, putting an end to the power 
struggles endemic to the media sector.
 Although the private sector is coping much better with the transitional 
phase, there is a need for providing this sector with a regulatory 
framework for its broadcasting outlets and guarantee of a more stable 
work environment for its journalists and media workers. 
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CHAPTER 2
Newsroom Dynamics, 
Professionalism and Its Relation 
to New Political Power
 
Libyan media has increasingly moved towards accommodating a plurality 
of voices. Once monopolised by few sources of information, it has evolved 
to become an open and diverse market where information sources are 
multiple and can be held accountable. However, this process is hindered by 
diverse obstacles: the lack of adequate skills within the media community 
due to isolation from modern media practices for many years, the inability 
of tribal-led Libya to allow for debate as a pillar of democratic society, the 
lack of experience on the part of new government and a culture of media 
manipulation and oppression that was spread under the former regime. 
Relationship to News Sources/Political Sphere 
With the fall of the regime, the relationship between journalists and their 
news sources has become more interactive and democratic. The complexity 
of the new political arena formed in the aftermath of parliamentary elections 
and the formation of the new government46 is allowing journalists to practice 
46. http://www.al-sharq.com/ArticleDetails.aspx?AID=212502&CatID=103&Title=%D8
%B2%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86+%D9%8A%D9%8F%D8%B9%D9%84%
D9%86+%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%84+%D8%A7%D9%84%
D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9+%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9
%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9+%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9-
%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9
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their role in questioning the new political power albeit with limitations. 
The struggle between different political factions has produced a beneficial 
result: journalists now cross-check the veracity of information from different 
sources, a notable move to increased transparency in a country where the 
news was once under total blackout. The game of “news leaks” is very 
much driving political reporting; belligerent politicians find media to be 
an excellent platform for flagging the shortcomings and mistakes of their 
rivals. However, this is a dangerous game where inexperienced journalists 
can be easily manipulated. How can journalists, who were once trained to 
receive pre-packaged news stories from the national news agency, now work 
to maintain delicate relationships with sources? According to Mahmoud el-
Misrati, the editor-in-chief and owner of newspaper Libya al Jadida, leaks 
have become his saving grace in allowing him access and insight to uncover 
backstage politicking:
 “Leaks are more honest and transparent than official sources. For example, we 
were told about a suspicious deal brokered by the Ministry of the Interior. We 
asked the minister and he gave us false information. An honest employee inside 
the ministry leaked us the relevant document. As long as the ministry was not 
able to issue another document to counter the one we received, we can pretend 
that the information we have is valid.”
For the host of a political talk show on Libya al-Hurra TV station, the political 
struggle is allowing him greater access to originally sourced information. 
According to Mohamed kamal Bazaza, a former engineering student who 
found himself as a talk show host without any previous training, sources 
provide fodder for political discussion:
 “I have informed sources within my personal network. I use this information 
to challenge my guests. I benefit from the tensions between representatives of 
different political parties in the parliament. If I meet someone from this party, 
they will provide me with tips against another party.”
If questioning players in the new political sphere is finally possible in the post-
Gaddafi era, it is not a simple and straightforward process. Journalists and 
their sources have yet to become fully acclimatised to this move away from 
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the practices of the former regime. This has greater implications for media 
outlets—new and old alike—that, though no longer provided with news by 
dictation, are still financially supported by the state.
The recent experience of Zeinab al Habbas, a former language corrector in the 
old regime’s press publications and later a reporter for Febrayer newspaper,47 is 
very much reflective of this complexity: 
 “The official I interview welcomes me usually saying that they are open for 
my questions. When I publish their answers, they call my editor saying that I 
caused them trouble, although I recorded the interview. Sometimes they send 
letters to the editor saying that the newspaper is looking to create trouble for 
them. For instance, I published information I got from the minister of energy 
about electricity shortage during (the fasting month of) Ramadan. The news 
was on the front page given its importance and it was picked up by local 
media. The minister called me extremely angry and pressured me to deny the 
information. I refused arguing that this will impact my credibility and that the 
information is accurate and recorded. He called a TV station and told them 
that the information was false.”
New political players are still largely operating within the confines of the 
former regime’s media clampdown. In the pre-revolution era news was what 
people discussed at home behind closed doors and sensitive information was, 
even when verified and sourced, subject to nondisclosure. News broadcasts 
were vetted by the regime and often conflicted with factual reports. 
Libyan politicians are still struggling with the fact that information is now 
promulgated and can no longer be confined to closed quarters. In other 
words, they can no longer dictate the news agenda since media has become 
diverse and increasingly transparent. 
47. Febrayer newspaper was launched immediately after the revolution and supported 
financially by the state. Its name is in reference to February, the month of the revolutions.
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“Before, we used to have only one red line: Gaddafi and his family. After 
the liberation, we have hundreds of red lines. If I criticised a political 
party, I would receive an angry phone call. If I criticise a minister for their 
performance or decisions, I—or even the media institution where I work—
become labelled as troublemakers and the ministry could sometime refuse 
to deal with us anymore. I might also risk losing my job.”
—Mohamed Saghir, freelance reporter, 
former reporter for the regime Libiyya TV channel
“There is a new tool to terrorise media: the accusation of causing national 
discord. Every time we tackle a problem, we are accused of causing national 
discord. If we criticise a politician his tribe would accuse us of being racist 
or biased. There are stories that media cannot tell today. Being critical in 
Libya today is not possible. The other party cannot accept criticism as a 
legitimate expression of opinion.”
—Gumaa el Osta, owner of al-Assema TV station 
If traditional news sources are struggling to maintain control over the flow of 
information, they are now facing unexpected competition from social media. 
New media, mainly Facebook, is no longer solely a platform to interact with 
audiences; it has become a major source of news for even mainstream media 
(most journalists interviewed admitted to using Facebook as a main source 
for information). Newly established private TV stations have commonly 
been subjected to accusations of using Facebook as a source for serious and 
unverifiable allegations. Moreover former journalists for state media have 
migrated to Facebook where they use their personal pages to publish articles 
and comments according to personal agendas. These journalists, who have 
not returned to work in mainstream media, are reluctant to integrate into 
newly-established media institutions. Thus, they turn to Facebook as their 
main platform for publishing. These Facebook pages are frequently used as 
a platform for spreading baseless accusations and libellous statements These 
are then often used as news sources for mainstream media. 
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“The source of information is not clear anymore. Before, the source was 
identified and thereby responsible for the accuracy of the information. Now, 
I am not sure if what media is saying is real information or just rumours. 
No one can assume responsibility for the accuracy of the information. The 
source of the news is no longer responsible. They can even be unknown.”
—Abdallah Rached, former state media journalist working now 
for al Bilad al-AAn, a new state funded weekly 
“Nothing can be hidden anymore. For example, we were waiting for the 
new government to be announced the next day. The press had already 
published the ministers’ names. The names were leaked to the press. This is 
all positive as leaks feed us with news. There is a high level of transparency 
especially with the activity on Facebook, although rumours are creating 
confusion. The tribal incitement on Facebook even impacted the official 
decision-making in the incidents between the cities of Misrata and of 
Bani Walid.48 The government had to take tough decisions based on the 
incitement carried out via Facebook.”
—Rana Akabani, former journalist in state media, 
reporter for Correspondents.org project
Skills and Professionalism 
It is undeniable that the media industry in post-Gaddafi Libya witnessed a 
critical change. However, the swift turn from an extremely monitored media 
regime to an extremely open and disorganised one has left these journalists 
48. Dozens of people are believed to have been killed, and some 200 injured in the recent 
violence between the cities of Misrata and BaniWalid in Western Libya, after a former 
rebel responsible for the killing of Gaddafi, was captured and tortured in BaniWalid, a 
former stronghold of Libyan ex-leader. Pro-government forces, many of whom are from 
the rival town of Misrata, were shelling BaniWalid for several days, igniting tribal frictions 
between the two cities known for a long history of hostility. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-middle-east-20077404
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‘lost in translation’. What does it mean to be a journalist? How can one work 
without clear guidelines, directives and boundaries? What does it mean to be 
professional and how? Under the former regime, the form and the content 
of the media production were a major problem. The media industry was 
conceived as a platform to express a multitude of opinions and practiced 
under the former regime as such. According to Abdel Razzak Dahesh, who 
was the longest running editor-in-chief in the history of Libyan state media:
 “Gaddafi’s Green Book considered the press an amateurish hobby and not a 
real profession tasked with uncovering the truth. Gaddafi conceived of the press 
as union publications where each profession has its own publication tasked with 
reflecting its views.”
Political or non-political, media production– broadcast and print alike—
is linked to the regime’s national, regional and international agendas. An 
obvious indicator is its storytelling style: all stories, even light ones about 
cultural events, typically start with lengthy non-newsy introductions that 
do nothing other than praise the regime for its achievements. One of the 
main problems Libyan journalists are facing in this new transitional period 
for media is figuring out what exactly the news is. This is the result of years 
of applying pre-packaged news pieces. However, those who are popularly 
called the “media of the revolution”—ordinary citizens who contributed to 
reporting the events of the revolution—have the upper hand; this new body 
of “journalists” has proven to learn quickly and without reliance on media 
stereotypes.
The brief openness of the media sector under Gaddafi in the latest years of 
the regime provided Libyan journalists and their audiences with exposure 
to a variety of media content. However the state-owned media reform was 
restricted to upgrading equipment to more modern technological tools and 
with no impact to the content itself. According to Mohamed Baio, former 
head of the GPC:
 “We managed to have a better media product in the latter years of the former 
regime but only in form. Our problem was the lack of real journalists, the 
professional ones. The quality of the journalist is much more important 
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than the technical capacities. The problem of Libyan media is that it did not 
succeed in attracting Arab talents and became totally isolated from its Arab 
environment.”49
In post-Gaddafi Libya, journalists can experience new genres such as 
investigative reporting, feature writing and portraits. However, according to 
most journalists interviewed, the most prominent pieces are political reports. 
As such, news writing and political reporting seems to require better coaching 
and guidance from editors (who, along with their staff, appear to be poorly 
prepared for the transition). A hands-on approach was the standard approach 
for Libyan journalists to learn their profession. Most of those interviewed did 
not study journalism at university but rather some related discipline such as 
political science, arts or economics. Many of them recounted that journalism 
was not a career choice but was instead serendipitous or just a good job 
opportunity. According to Samira al Hojaili, the head of Journalism at the 
media and communications faculty at Tripoli’s university, courses provided 
to media students were mostly theoretical and totally disconnected from 
the reality of the market. The main handicap, Hojaili said, is the inability of 
former state media to provide training for media graduates, thereby pushing 
those graduates into other industries.50
The National News Agency and the Challenge of 
Professionalism: A Case Study
The Libyan News agency51 (formerly JANA, the Jamahiriya New Agency), 
established in 1946, was transformed into the conveyer of the regime’s 
messages nationally and internationally during the Gaddafi regime. The 
agency was under the tight control of Gaddafi himself and the dictate of the 
powerful information bureau, responsible for providing directives on how to 
49. Interview with author, Tripoli, October 2012.
50. Interview with author, Tripoli October 2012.
51. http://www.lana-news.ly/ar/
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tackle each and every news item even when unrelated to the internal affairs 
of the regime. For instance, a storm hitting the US was reported as nature’s 
anger against imperialistic America; former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein 
could not be named without adding “the traitor” as honorific. This was 
considered general news and was propagated by state media’s political news 
slots with amendments forbidden. There was no need for direct government 
intervention; journalists and other employees managed to self-censor as 
a mean to avoid “mistakes” often punishable by drastic measures such as 
imprisonment or loss of employment. The agency was tasked with providing 
Gaddafi with daily briefs on international and national news. State control 
over the agency’s production facilitated tight control over and manipulation 
of political news, both related to internal and international affairs. This was 
not limited to content but also affected news formatting which had to follow 
a strict formula. Any initiative beyond this format, even a minor one, was 
interpreted as rebellion and could lead to imprisonment.
After JANA was rebranded into Libyan News Agency52 (LANA), the 
modernisation of this old-fashioned body into a professional news provider 
has proved to be a thorny process. The rebranding operation started with an 
attempt to change the discourse from redundant and non-newsy reporting 
into a newsier format where the main elements of any story are clearly 
presented. The agency is still far from achieving this major change. Bashir 
Zooghbiya, elected by the transitional government as head of the agency’s 
steering committee (later pushed out by the agency’s staff), recounts the 
difficult process of rebranding the agency.
 “We told the staff that each news item has to have an identified source and 
that any statement should be recorded. This was our major battle: regaining 
the trust and respect of sources as a professional agency providing accurate and 
objective news.”
This reorientation is proving difficult. The rehabilitation process started with 
training local correspondents in different regions of the country so they could 
52. http://en.libyamediawiki.com/index.php?title=News_Agencies
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better decipher internal Libyan affairs for an international audience. This is 
not an easy task with the limited number of correspondents (30 journalists 
for 240 admin staff) and poor reporting skills, a legacy of the former regime.
Abdel Basset Abou Daya, head of the news department, describes this 
process:
 “The first challenge was to kill the fear factor inside journalists. We told them 
you can publish a story and if you make a mistake, that is fine, it can be 
corrected. It was essential for them to adapt to a situation [where] no leader is 
no longer sacred and there are no red lines other than the unity of Libya and 
the safety of its territories. The sub-editor is able to publish a story without the 
editor-in-chief’s permission. Before, even a simple story needed approval.”
This is not an easy task. According to Bashir Zohbiya:
 “It is extremely difficult for journalists to improve upon the practices they 
learned and applied for years in news reporting. In the first anniversary of 
the revolution, they wrote stories using the same glorification style that used to 
be applied in covering the regime’s revolution anniversaries. They just replace 
the phrase ‘September Al Fateh revolution’ (of Gaddafi) to ‘the February 
revolution’.” 
In the aftermath of the revolution the news agency was put under the 
direction of a steering committee of five members; the former leading figures, 
whose passports were confiscated by the rebels, had not returned to work. 
The members of the steering committee used to be senior journalists and/
or managers in the agency who have no formal ties to the former regime. 
However the real decision-makers inside the news agency are its staff. 
For example they have already managed to push the head of the steering 
committee out. These internal struggles plunged the agency into such 
turmoil that it obstructed news production. The lack of leadership for the 
steering committee handicapped its own ability to take strategic decisions 
especially with regard to appointing new staff and developing training. In the 
post-revolution media, the transitional nature of the appointed management 
as well as the links between journalists and rebels (as some journalists used to 
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fight with the rebels) make the hierarchy structure loose and unintelligible, 
according to senior staff interviewed. 
The news agency is trying to impose itself as the main provider for local 
news with management pushing journalists out of the newsroom and into 
the streets to report on daily events. The agency is striving to build networks 
of contacts with the new power structure that requires more than mere 
state-sanctioned veneration. This necessitates a complete restructuring of 
the agency, including a pay scale reconfiguration (most of them earn 500 to 
1,000 LD as monthly wages53) and a new approach to maintaining workplace 
efficiency and discipline (for example firing staff is still not a socially and 
culturally accepted measure in Libya). According to Abdel Baset Abou Daya: 
 “One of our main problems is chaos. I cannot even ask a journalist to work a 
night shift. They understand the new freedom they have to mean that they can 
do whatever they want.”
Media Institutions’ Dynamics
The media industry under the former regime was run by a centralised 
system governed by a linear and continuously changing structure. Media 
institutions themselves were governed by an equally centralised system 
where the personality of the editor-in-chief was instrumental in determining 
the performance of the newspaper and its flexibility in approaching red lines. 
The editor-in-chief could somehow push the boundaries without breaching 
it. The trust the regime had in these prominent editors-in-chief and their 
loyalty allowed them greater room to manoeuvre. 
“Media institutions were like all other sectors under the regime: institutions 
of heads. When the heads were gone after the revolution, the institutions 
faced a real vacuum.”
—Razan el-Moghrabi, 
former editor of a cultural magazine and writer
53. Around 300–700 dollars.
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The personalisation of the media industry is a remnant of the Gaddafi era. 
The personality of the editor-in-chief, director or owner of a news network 
or station can still be detrimental to its tone and performance. According to 
most journalists interviewed, the lack of newsroom structure or an editorial 
line is the result of both the amplified role of the editor-in-chief and the 
inability of the media to live up to its expectations as a news provider. Abdel 
Razzak Dahesh, former editor-in-chief of al-Jamahiriya newspaper, argues that 
his intervention was a necessity given the poor quality of journalists: 
 “I had to be pragmatic. I had to monitor the production otherwise the quality 
would be very poor. Some journalists used to ask to write their questions for 
doing an interview.”
The sudden fall of the old leadership and the lack of internal structure with 
clear roles and hierarchy has led to a situation where former junior to mid-
level staff are now in leadership positions; the main criteria for nominating 
new leadership is independence from the former regime, not professional 
experience. According to Idriss el-Mismari, head of the Committee for 
the Support and the Encouragement of the Press, the new managers are 
“enthusiastic colleagues willing to do something different. Some of them have some 
previous experience in journalism under the former regime.”54
“The new management is extremely poor in managerial skills. There is an 
illusion that leadership (in media and other institutions) is a reward. This is 
why there is a competition today for these leading positions among leading 
opportunists and not leading professionals. We had first rate leadership 
in state media but we did not form second-rate leadership: the managing 
editors, directors… This is the problem today.” 
—Mohammed Baio, former head of the General Press Corporation 
The situation in the private sector is equally volatile. Most of the new private 
media are run by a basic managerial structure which in continuously changing. 
Conceived as a tool to express the voice of the revolution, these media were 
54. Interview with author, Tripoli, October 2012.
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simply a platform for serving a cause—especially considering a number of 
their staff were also rebels. A situation brilliantly expressed by the presenter 
of privately owned Libya al-Hurra TV station—the first to convey the voice of 
the revolution—broadcasting from a small studio. As per Mohamed Kamal 
Bazaza:
 “Media mistakes were tolerated. I did not have the mentality of a presenter 
but that of a rebel. I still don’t 100% have that mentality. I still think I have a 
message to send to Libyan people.”55
Media started to move towards establishing an institutional structure and 
to depart from the revolutionary discourse. Songs and slogans praising 
the revolution became less prominent in TV programming in favour of 
broadcasting political activities. 
“We changed the name of the radio from Sawt Libya al-Hurra (voice 
of free Libya) to Benghazi FM. The old name was very much linked to 
the revolution. The revolutionary tone is played down; we are covering 
political life. This comes first. We still have a revolutionary tone to some 
degree. We began to include some songs and social slots. We adopted a 
calmer tone but the revolution is still present.”
—Ahmed al Mukassabi Benghazi FM, 
main programmes presenter 
“We are no longer talking about revolution. We have social series and talk 
shows. We decided to use neutral discourse: ‘the former regime of Gaddafi’ 
and not ‘the despot,’ ‘the tyrant’ or other negative popular descriptions.” 
—Chairman of Libya TV Mohsen el-Shaeri
55. Interview with author, Tripoli, October 2012.
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Flourishing Talk Shows: Debating Politics
Talk show programmes flourished in post-revolution Libya as an unprece-
dented exercise of public debate. With the lack of news slots in most 
broadcast media, these talk shows provided slots with the latest news from 
different regions of the country. However the lack of experience on the part 
of both the talk show hosts and their guests—who were usually from the new 
political sphere—makes these programmes far from professional. Most hosts 
had no previous experience or training in media and were simply thrown 
in to sink or swim. Enjoying unprecedented audience participation, most 
talk shows feature controversial topics and the opportunity to phone in. In 
other cases hosts literally present from the streets where random people are 
asked to express their opinions on the latest political developments. In some 
cases, spur-of-the-moment opining degenerates into insults, slander and 
defamation. 
In post-revolution Libya—rife with tribal tension, political struggles and 
spread of arms—debating politics in the public sphere is a dangerous practice. 
Talk show hosts therefore had to learn how to navigate touchy subjects. 
Under the revolution and in the first months of transition, the main goal of 
these shows was to encourage dissent of the former regime. Zainab al Zaidi, a 
former social programmes presenter in the former state media, was one of the 
main talk show hosts who voiced the message of rebels:
 “My task was then to make Libyans cry. I myself was crying when I spoke 
about the regime’s atrocities. It was crucial to liberate Libyans from fear.”56
With the increasing complexity of political affairs post-revolution, talk show 
content became more mundane and is struggling to tackle controversial 
issues inherent to Libya’s new political sphere. For al-Assema TV’s principal 
talk show host Mahmoud al-Sharkasy it is simply impossible to host opposing 
voices on the same platform, especially since most of his guests refuse to 
participate alongside their rivals. If al-Sharkasy was not afraid to tackle topics 
56. Interview with authors, Tripoli, October 2012. 
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such as the power of extremist militias and the lack of rule of law among 
others, the continuous threats he is receiving has pushed him to finally 
become less critical. “They sent me indirect threats reminding me that I have a 
family and children,” he confided. “I am not afraid of them but I became wiser 
and less enthusiastic. I am now calculating risks and limiting its scope.” When 
al-Sharkasy tackled the growing role of the Mufti—the higher religious 
authority in the country appointed after the fall of the regime—on one of his 
talk shows, dozens of the Mufti’s supporters demonstrated near the station’s 
offices asking for a face-to-face with the presenter. “My manager asked me to 
go out and to talk to them,” he said. “I refused. I have nothing to tell them. I was 
doing my job.”57
The learning experience of Mohamed Kamal Bazaza, a university student who 
became a talk show host of Libya al-Hurra TV station, reflects the dangers of 
hands-on learning in the complex political transition. He recounts: 
 “Armed groups have the same culture of Gaddafi. They could even kidnap 
me. I am careful in my uses of expressions. For example I often say ‘phalanges 
of the revolution’ instead of militias. The word ‘militias’ is not accepted by our 
audience. I also make sure not to relate the news to myself. I only announce the 
news and leave the comment for my guest. I never comment on it myself.” 
While the presenter of al-Hurra TV station is careful with his expressions 
by self-censorship, Benghazi FM radio presenter Ahmed al Mukassabi claims 
that “friendship” with militia leaders is granting him some protections. The 
presenter, who used to work under the former regime and defected soon after 
the outbreak of the revolution, recounts: 
 “I hosted a leader of armed phalanges who put his guns on the table between us. 
I was not afraid. Although he is quite strict, there is some friendship between us. 
They trust me because of my position against the regime. This does not impact 
the debate itself. I support phalanges when they do good things but I can be 
critical in matters related to the spread of arms and insecurity.”
57. Interview with author, Tripoli, October 2012.
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Training and Media Development Efforts
Most Libyan journalists benefit from training, albeit poor training. The 
former regime’s centre for information was rebranded as a specialised body 
for documenting the developments in the press and facilitating journalistic 
training. The centre acts as the main intermediary between training 
organisations and journalists. According to the head of the centre Khaled 
Ghoulam, it has developed a database of around 1,200 journalists. As 
Ghoulam explains: 
 “Before, we used to accept any request for training. Today journalists have to 
go through a process of selection based on an application. We cannot accept 
anyone.”
Alongside the centre are other local initiatives providing media development 
organisations with links to the community of journalists. The lack of criteria 
in accepting trainees and the absence of a body representing journalists 
means the process is mainly based on solid contacts journalists have within 
these intermediate centres. 
Journalistic training programmes generally focus on basic skills such as news 
writing, interview techniques or field reporting. According to journalists 
interviewed, most of these programmes are similar with no distinction 
between media platforms—such as radio or television—and without taking 
into consideration the difference in professional levels of trainees. Most 
criticism of the quality of training provided focusses on the quality of trainers, 
mainly brought from other Arab media industries facing similar problems, 
and the short length of these sessions (spanning just a few days). Most of the 
positive feedback provided by journalists was related to specific programmes 
where media development goes beyond a simplistic approach to training to 
long-term coaching and where trainers are working alongside newsroom 
journalists. The biggest hindrance to professional media training is the 
disjuncture between these training sessions and local newsrooms needs. 
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“The frontline media community—citizen journalists—is quite ready 
to transform into successful professionals. They have unusual energy 
and capacities. They are not professional but they have trained on the 
ground under extremely limited resources. They are very enthusiastic by 
comparison to most of those who worked in the regime’s media.”
—Hussam Zaagar, head of Free Media Centre
“The problem with training is that it is based on connections with the wrong 
people; they are working with civil society groups. They want to deliver 
their programmes, that is all. Now they (media development organisations) 
have started to contact media institutions directly, and this is much better.”
—Mahmoud al Sharkasy, Talk show host, al-Assema TV station
“Those who are providing training are not that qualified. The content is 
also not relevant and the duration is very limited. You cannot produce a 
journalist with two weeks of training. It is not possible to bring someone 
and transform them into a journalist in a few days. As for the former media 
staff: it is not possible to re-animate a dead body. Training should focus on 
media graduates and those successful experiences and talents in the Arab 
world.”
—Mahmoud el Misrati, editor-in-chief, Libya al Jadida newspaper
Chapter Recommendations
 Training should be tailored to newsroom realities. Given the specific 
conditions of Libyan media, mainly its isolation from a modern working 
environment for many years, it is crucial for this training to bring an 
answer to the specific challenges facing the rebirth of this media industry.
 Alongside the provision of training on basic media production, there is 
an acute need to provide specific training on business management as 
well as leadership for editors and managers, especially where these skills 
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are lacking. Providing specific training for specific needs such as talk 
show management, news presentation, investigative reporting, reporting 
of elections and parliamentary reporting among other topics is crucial. 
Being able to define these needs requires an in depth understanding of 
the nature of the media industry and direct interactivity/dialogue with its 
main actors. 
 Beyond the simple training of how to write a new piece or interview, it 
is important to move to a system where media development activities 
contribute to the empowerment of media institutions through a long 
term structure of coaching/mentoring that will enable journalists and 
editors/managers to benefit from the experience of their counterparts via 
collegial and horizontal communication. 
 Media literacy should be a major element of media development 
programmes. There is a need for a media literate public in post-Gaddafi 
Libya. Consumers and citizens need to be aware of the opportunities as 
well as the risks offered by the newly opened media. The testimonies 
of journalists interviewed in this study demonstrate that one major 
problem is the inability of audiences to understand the role of media and 
to respond to it adequately. This is also relevant for the new political 
actors who have a limited understanding of the role of a free media in a 
developed democracy.
 Professional journalists need professional and solid institutions providing 
them with a secure working environment. Establishing new institutional 
structures and newsroom dynamics as well as new editorial decision-
making processes are crucial to move towards professional and viable 
institutions. Few media organisations started to define roles within a 
clear internal structure. It is important to empower these new trends by 
providing newsrooms with adequate expertise. 
 It is crucial to raise journalist awareness about the nature of their role. 
Once considered to be the mouthpiece of the regime, these journalists 
need to safeguard their newfound freedom by resisting external control 
and self-censorship. It is a battle that should be led by journalists 
themselves with the support of media development agencies. 
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CHAPTER 3
Working in a Transitional 
Environment
Libyan journalists had to adapt quickly to a fluid and risky media environment. 
Their lack of job security also meant they had to adapt to the special conditions 
of the political transition; the growing power of armed groups proved them to 
be the real rulers of the country. Human rights watchdogs frequently reported 
abuse at the hands of these militias as internal power struggles became a real 
challenge for the transitional government. Under these conditions, working 
in media could prove to be risky. 
Who Runs the Place? 
Gaddafi’s regime ended with the fall of Tripoli in the hands of rebels in August 
2010.58 However, with the intensification of warfare, most Libyan state 
media stopped operating weeks prior. They went off the air with the arrival 
of rebels in Tripoli. While old state newspapers stopped publishing, broadcast 
media—more specifically TV stations—continued to report for short periods, 
announcing the fall of the regime and airing revolutionary songs. Not only was 
the political regime in turmoil but so was the media. With Benghazi leading 
the way, the revolution spread throughout the eastern regions of the country 
enabling local media outlets to have the upper hand on the media sector.59
58. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8715116/Libya-
timeline-of-the-last-hours-of-the-Gaddafi-regime.html#, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-africa-15422262
59. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/23/benghazi-joy-end-libya-tyranny
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The fall of Tripoli proved crucial in the media war; central media were blamed 
for the regime’s survival because of their role in spreading its propaganda. 
The silence of these media was considered the tangible proof that the regime 
became from the past. 
Mustafa al-Touarghi, an al-Libiyya TV journalist who joined the rebel forces, 
was among the first to enter the station after rebels stormed it. “We first 
stopped the broadcasting,” he said. “After this we restarted the radio broadcast 
with revolutionary songs. We aired a communique announcing the fall of the regime. 
After this, we interrogated employees who were still inside the building. Those who 
used to flatter the regime were arrested. Some were asked to remain at home with 
their salaries paid. We confiscated the passports of some of the staff. They are 
requested to remain inside the country until the judiciary takes the file into their 
hands.” He frames these acts under “the revolutionary legitimacy” which—
according to him—grants the rebels the authority to take such measures. 
The first days after the liberation of Tripoli were chaotic. A power struggle 
between different groups over who had ownership rights over the state media 
apparatus was concentrated in Tripoli. This power struggle is best illustrated 
by the conflicting decisions taken by various transitional bodies on the fate of 
these media outlets. This power struggle was not restricted to media facilities 
but also covered state buildings, with various groups laying claim to a stake. A 
notable example of this internal strife is the battle for control over the flagship 
al-Libiyya TV, which was the main TV station of al-Ghad Media Group. The 
station went off the air after the fall of the regime. Controversy ensued when 
the privately held, and Benghazi-based, Libya al-Hurra TV station moved 
to Tripoli and broadcasted from the headquarters of al-Libiyya with its own 
logo plastered across their newscasts. There are disputed versions about this 
alleged “occupation” of al-Libiyya TV station by Libya al-Hurra, which later 
ended with the latter’s withdrawal. Libya al-Hurra director Saleh Majdoub 
refuted this version of events and contends the decision to broadcast from 
state TV headquarters was a symbolic gesture:
 “In that time, there were no institutions. Under the legitimacy of the revolution, 
all can change. We wanted to seize the occasion. We went to the local council 
of Tripoli. They were convinced about our project. We wanted to be the new 
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official voice of the state. It was important that the voice of the revolution be 
transmitted through a TV station which was a symbol of the regime. This 
would be instrumental in supporting the revolution which was still raging in the 
country.” 
Immediately after the fall of the regime, most of the old media apparatus 
facilities were under the protection of former rebels or armed groups. The 
majority of these groups are still providing “protection” for these media 
outlets and are accused of making editorial decisions under the so-called 
flag of “revolutionary legitimacy.” According to Mariam Hajjaji, appointed 
director of radio al-Libiyya, “the real bosses are our guards. I am not able to take 
decisions because if I take any measure against staff, the guards will support them 
against my decision. The interference was to the extent that some of them went 
into the studio and asked the presenter to leave. In some cases, they just shut down 
the broadcast. We talked to the Ministry of Culture. They said we don’t want 
confrontation.”
“We don’t interfere with the programmes; we now act under the legitimacy 
of the state. We are part of the state, but we can forbid former staff from 
entering the building if they have blood on their hands.”
—Mustafa Taourghi, al-Wataniyya head of security, 
former rebel, former journalist 
“The rebels are not controlling the TV stations. Sometimes they express 
some opinions and it could be the right thing to do. For example, a former 
employee who used to be a regime supporter came to the station asking 
to be paid for previous work. They objected to paying him... Sometimes 
they (the rebels) are alerting us about the right things to do. I call this 
a revolutionary caution. We are still in transition. Things will return to 
normal after a while.”
—Ali Mohamed Salem, al-Wataniyyah TV head of news 
With the return to live broadcast some of these newsrooms witnessed 
internal “intifada” by the staff, such as pushing out managers appointed by 
l  52  l
Libya Media Transition: Heading to the Unknown
the transitional power. While these cases differ from one outlet to another, 
the common denominator behind most staff objections was refusal to accept 
external leadership. The problem of discipline inside these newsrooms is 
another prominent one where managers, appointed under the transitional 
phase, struggle to assert their authority and to impose order. It was very 
frequent to hear from managers that it is very difficult to impose staff time-
keeping or other administrative tasks, setbacks equally witnessed inside 
new private media. In some cases, like the former National News Agency—
now called Libya News Agency—these internal struggles led the appointed 
manager’s resignation thus disrupting daily news production. Bashir Zohbiya, 
who was managing the agency, explains:
 “Most of the journalistic staff have the mentality of employees and not 
journalists. They asked for additional work without really working. They 
understand freedom in that they can do whatever they want. One of the staff 
was absent from work and when he returned, he brought me a letter from a 
rebels’ faction stating he was on a special revolutionary mission!”
Who Funds the New Libyan Media?
The lack of transparency and consistency is another prominent handicap of 
transitional Libyan media: the former state media is still funded under the 
same system. Most former state media staff are still on payroll and continue 
to receive salaries although most of them are not working. 
With the unprecedented opening up of media to the private sector, the 
industry is booming with new projects. Most of these projects are perceived as 
linked to political agendas, the most vehement critics labelling them as “the 
coalition of guns and funds.” If politicians avidly use the new open media 
sector for their own interests, business executives are equally complicit; 
broadcast outlets are the most attractive media platform for both political 
battles and business opportunities. The radio sector boom has proven it to be 
the most popular media.
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The private media are usually categorised according to popular perceptions: 
those liberal (mainly supporting former transitional council leader Mahmood 
Jibril), those who are supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and those funded 
directly by Qatar. This perception of simplified alliances is rejected by these 
main actors who usually present themselves as independent and funded only 
by Libyan business and advertising revenues. There are unconfirmed reports 
about Libyan media receiving funds from business executives of the former 
regime who are living abroad. Allegations about the Muslim Brotherhood 
pouring huge funds into different media outlets are also rampant yet 
unconfirmed. I interviewed Saleh Majdoub, chairman of Libya al-Hurra TV 
station, about the Libyan media landscape post-revolution. I questioned him 
about the link between Libya al-Hurra and the Muslim Brotherhood, with 
whom the TV station is viewed to be politically aligned. In response he stated 
“I am a member of the group but the group does not finance the station.”60
The battle between pro-liberal and pro-Islamic agendas, raging in several 
transitional Arab countries, is also reflected in the new and diverse Libyan 
media landscape. Al-Assema TV station is generally perceived as the platform 
for liberal anti-religious voices, a description that it not totally refuted by the 
owner of the station Gumaa el Osta. He said “during the elections we did not 
hide our affiliation and support for the candidacy of Jibril (Mahmoud Jibril, the 
head of the National Forces Alliance who won the elections), but we treated the 
other equally in terms of broadcasting their electoral publicity slots.”61 Libya al-
Hurra TV station is considered the main voice of the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Libya. The station was accused of bias towards extremist Islamic factions 
in its reporting on popular demonstrations in Benghazi.62 The head of the 
station Saleh al-Majdoub refuted the Islamic label stating that the TV station 
is at equal distance from various affiliations.63 Libya al-Ahrar,64 broadcasting 
60. Interview with author, October 2012.
61. Interview with author, Tripoli, October 2012.
62. See http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/21/benghazi-anti-militia-protest_n_19038
46.html
63. Interview with author, Benghazi, October 2012.
64. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tNbgI4jAGYI
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from Doha with large operations inside Libya (its main office is in Tripoli), 
is considered the most-viewed TV station as well as the most professional 
news source. According to al-Tai Consulting report,65 focus groups organised 
around the country demonstrated that the station, which acted as the main 
voice of the opposition during the revolution, is the most popular among 
Libyans—although the most controversial. The station, popularly called Libya 
“al-Ashrar” instead of “al- Ahrar” (“the bad” instead of “the free”), is accused 
of serving the agenda of its funder, Qatar. The station is also accused of 
supporting controversial propositions such as dividing the country. However 
the head of the station’s office in Tripoli, Ibrahim el-Mezwoghi, refuted all 
these accusations. For el-Mezwoghi, these allegations are related to the fact 
that Libyan audiences have not yet accepted the notion of free debate and, 
thus, consider any critical voice as an attack against a group or a tribe.66
Most of these new media outlets were born to support the rebels by countering 
state media propaganda. The majority of these media ventures were born 
outside the country, mainly in Tunisia and Egypt. Some are struggling to 
adopt a business model or to redefine their identity in the post-revolution 
era while some others simply did not survive the transitional phase. Take 
for example the testimony of Gumaa el Osta, former chairman of the Libyan 
Chamber of Commerce and a well-established businessman. El Osta, who 
owns al-Assema TV station, had this to say:
 “The TV station was born for the revolution phase only. We wanted to stop 
this project with the fall of the regime, thinking that the former state media 
would resume work. This did not happen. What pushed us to continue was 
the discourse carried by some media accusing those who remained inside the 
country under the regime of treason. With the proliferation of media funded 
by the Muslim Brotherhood, we found that we had a patriotic mission to 
continue broadcasting; the goal was not media itself but the challenges of the 
new politics.”67
65. To download the report, see http://www.altaiconsulting.com/expertise/democraty-gover
nance 
66. Interview with author, Tripoli, October 2012.
67. Interview with author, October 2012.
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However the TV station is struggling to adopt a sustainable business model. 
According to el Osta, he is willing to implement a public/private hybrid 
funding model for the network; although the door is open for the public to 
buy shares, he will retain a 51 per cent stake so as to maintain its editorial 
line. 
While these new broadcast media outlets are not required to reveal their 
sources of funding, they must obtain from the Ministry of Culture a minimum 
six-month temporary licence with the possibility for renewal. In print media, 
it is not clear if new private publications must adhere to any licensing system. 
One of the main challenges for these new publications is how to subsist 
on limited funds for printing and distributing; with the fall of the regime, 
these industries are no longer propped up by the state. Since most of these 
publications are not yet sustainable, it is impossible to find accurate figures 
on the distribution of these new publications. 
Small projects are generally funded by the business activities of their owners. 
However most of these media owners had no previous experience in media 
and their interest in it was often a means to buy their way into political 
conversation. Thus the majority of these projects lack long-term planning 
and are based on volunteer staff or poorly paid youth. Some projects were 
launched by doctors, engineers, university students or other professionals, 
but they rarely survived the pressure and the realities of the media industry. 
The owner of Tripolis magazine, a medicine student who took arms during 
the revolution, considers the publication his “baby.”68 He managed to publish 
a few issues despite limited financial resources and volunteer staff. Tripolis is 
just one example of hundreds of personal projects taken on in a more open 
media landscape, though most have since halted production. While some 
have proved to be viable, some of these projects are driven by advertisements. 
Radio Zone69 for youth is a good example. The radio station, which broadcasts 
western music and social talk shows in the Libyan dialect, is popular among 
68. Interview with author.
69. See the radio website http://tunein.com/radio/Radio-Zone-1007-s165643/
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youth and university students and is owned by three partners. According 
to one of the owners, the tone of the radio station was based upon market 
trends as the goal was to establish a particular niche in the market. Even 
so, the radio station is not attracting enough advertisements to cover its 
operating costs.70
In their quest to adopt a business model, these new media projects have two 
main options: to accept the patronage of wealthy business executives who 
in return have some editorial input, or to secure monthly sponsorship from 
ministries and governmental departments in the form of advertisements 
and/or sales from copies. These two solutions appear to be more secure 
than relying on the unpredictable nature of advertisements prominent in 
the private sector. Mahmood al Misrati, the chairman of Libya al-Jadida 
newspaper, managed to move from a weekly to a daily publication by using 
a combination of resources: financial support from the state Committee for 
Supporting and Encouraging the Press (in return for providing former state 
media staff with employment) and advertisements revenues. He is mainly 
relying on freelancers paid piecemeal with few full time employees. The 
growing popularity of the publication attracted some offers from business 
executives who offered to buy shares or fixed advertisements slots. Selling 
the newspaper’s shares seems risky for the owner of the publication who, like 
el Osta, wants to preserve its identity and independence.71
Although some of these projects are showing signs of sustainability, though 
solid political or business patronage, others are proving to be more random 
in execution. Jawhara radio station, increasingly popular in Tripoli, is very 
much reflective of this situation. In response to my question about his plans 
for sustaining his project, the merchant owner of this new private station 
simply pointed his finger to the sky in allusion to God: God would help him 
find sufficient funds to keep his radio station live. All will be fine.72
70. Interview with the author.
71. Interview with author, October 2012.
72. Interview with author, October 2012.
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Field Reporting in a Hostile Environment
News slots and field reporting have returned to Libyan media after being used 
as a propaganda tool for many years under the former regime. However, news 
bulletins and field reporting are still to a large extent very limited and far from 
being professional in new Libyan media. For example few TV stations have 
news bulletins or other adequate coverage. Most of these stations recently 
started providing news slots with limited capacities, such as broadcasting one 
main news bulletin at prime time in the evening. There are varying reasons 
as to why new (and surviving old) Libyan media have been unable to provide 
adequate news coverage. Some are internal such as the lack of experienced 
personnel and the absence of appropriate newsroom structures. However, 
the nature of the transitional phase with its volatility and lack of security is 
hindering the development of professional and comprehensive news services. 
Most of what is provided in news coverage is still largely amateurish in its 
form and content. For instance, stories are hardly updated and news bulletins 
have no fixed allocated time or frequently extend beyond it. It is also apparent 
some news coverage—especially from state-funded media—is replicating the 
news agenda of the old regime such as general reverence and the granting of 
major coverage to governmental/parliamentary activity.
The inability of Libyan audiences to comprehend free and professional 
reporting is also a major handicap. It is leading to a situation where media is 
frequently portrayed as party to the struggle. The lack of professionalism of 
these media outlets and their clearly dictated political alliances, especially 
during crisis, are consolidating the popular belief that media is responsible 
for factional tensions in the country. A good example is the recent tension 
between the cities of Misrata and Bani Walid. These two western cities were 
in dispute over the alleged torture and killing of a Misrati rebel, believed to 
be involved in the killing of Gaddafi, by militias in Bani Walid. The situation 
escalated dramatically with Libyan forces launching an operation against 
the town of Bani Walid; an eight-day battle ended with the deaths of at 
least 20 people and more than 200 wounded.73 The impasse which fuelled 
73. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/24/bani-walid-captured-by-libya-government
l  58  l
Libya Media Transition: Heading to the Unknown
historical tribal frictions between the two towns highlighted a real challenge 
for Libyan media: balanced reporting. In their coverage on the Misrata/
BaniWalid tensions, most media failed to report both sides of the story for 
fear of retaliation. This means it has been difficult for Libyan media on the 
ground to establish facts based on accurate reportage and instead degenerate 
into taking sides. Some media outlets have even resorted to reporting news 
from politically charged Facebook pages where comments appear to incite 
discord. The local TV stations of the two towns, located in media markets that 
have flourished since the revolution, took the lead in the incitement campaign. 
According to Ibrahim el-Mezwoghi, the head of Libya al-Ahrar TV network’s 
Tripoli office, professional and balanced field reporting is next to impossible:
 “Tribal frictions and geographical divisions make it impossible for media to 
claim neutrality or provide unbiased account of events. Covering news is 
becoming increasingly difficult. Ordinary citizens often interpret news based on 
tribal affiliations. Some of our correspondents were threatened and others were 
literally beaten. We do not know who the real rebels are. Some became rebels 
after the fall of the regime.” 
This position was echoed by Saleh Majdoub, the chairman of Libya al-Hurra, 
whose Benghazi offices were attacked just a few weeks after we visited in 
October 2012.74
 “We have covered the events from inside Bani Walid many times. This is not a 
problem in itself. The problem is if I want to send a reporter to cover the event 
from inside Bani Walid, they will be forced to say only what the people of the 
city want them to say, under the threat of being attacked. This is why we sent 
our reporters to the borders of the city where they interviewed people while 
fleeing.” 
If field reporting of current events is becoming increasingly dangerous, 
investigative journalism is something newsrooms now tend to avoid. A trend 
74. http://english.ruvr.ru/2012_10_22/Alhurra-TV-office-destroyed-by-furious-protesters-
in-Benghazi/
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of tackling polemic topics followed immediately after the fall of the regime. 
However, frequent threats to journalists have led to a situation where both 
journalists and their managers are not so keen to expose themselves to 
unpredictable dangers, especially since most threats are anonymous. Most 
journalists interviewed who said they received threats for investigating new 
taboos—mainly militias and religion—said these threats were sent to them 
as mobile messages from an unknown sender. One journalist who published 
a story about Libyan Jews said he received an anonymous mobile message 
asking him “not to approach this area.” The frequency and unpredictability 
of this kind of intimidation that threatens personal harm or injury plunged 
journalists and their editors into confusion; while the former regime clearly 
defined areas that were not to be broached, the new red lines are vague and 
unpredictable. As journalists have now implicitly accepted these restrictions 
to be new red lines, this is leading to a situation where the political process 
is occupying the major part of the media coverage. Few stories tackle real 
polemics such as the spread of arms, the influence of militias, the weak 
role of state institutions such as the national army, extremist pressure and 
intimidation and the growing role of religious institutions represented by the 
Mufti.
“We were beaten and attacked from those who present themselves as rebels. 
When we criticised the supreme security committee,75 I was called to their 
offices and interrogated for six hours. On the occasion of the publication 
of an inaccurate news report related to the same committee, I was called 
again with my manager and interrogated for 11 hours. Once, I was sent 
for field reporting on a conflict between two cities. I was stopped by one of 
these cities’ militias. They asked me which channel I worked for. Then they 
slapped me on my face and asked me to leave. They told me I should be 
thankful that they did not do more.”
—Mohamed el- Saghir, freelance TV reporter, 
former reporter for al-Assema TV channel
75. Former rebels who gathered under this umbrella and are claiming being under the remit 
of the Ministry of Interior.
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“I asked a reporter from my team to do an investigative report on prison 
torture. The reporter met a victim of torture and a prison guard. When 
she went back to office, she was so scared from what she saw and heard 
that she asked to stop working on this report. We lately stopped tackling 
this issue.” 
—Mahmoud al-Sharkasy, al-Assema TV station, 
talk show host and anchor 
The Media Reconciliation 
The Libyan media community post-Gaddafi is composed of three distinct 
groups. The first group is the staff of the former state media apparatus, few 
of whom work in post-revolution media institutions while senior editors and 
managers are at large or assigned at residence pending trial as per the rebels’ 
orders. The second group is what is called the “media of the revolution” 
or “the frontline media.” This group of citizen journalists who documented 
the rebellion’s developments is largely composed of doctors, engineers and 
other working professionals. The third group of emerging figures in the media 
sector is largely made up of former vocal dissenters from the Gaddafi era who 
have no previous newsroom experience and are mostly writers and cultural 
figures. An implicit power struggle for control over the media sector is raging 
between these three groups with the first group, the only one with previous 
media training, proving to be the weakest.
After the revolution, a campaign of labelling and making unfounded 
accusations divided the media community. Those who are labelled as pro-
revolution were pitted against those who are accused of being pro-former 
regime, popularly called Tahaleb (“algae”). This campaign is not limited to 
the media sector but extends to all other industries where leading figures 
were removed from office under an administrative purge of remaining figures 
from the Gaddafi era. The High Commission for the Application of the 
Standards of Integrity and Patriotism, an independent body formed by the 
transitional council post-revolution tasked with overseeing the appointment 
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of new leadership in official positions, is not linked to the former regime.76 
This Standards and Integrity body, mandated to disband at the end of the 
transitional phase, has sparked controversy over its practices. For example 
some media officials were banned from returning to office in former state 
media entities by the authority of this body. Some are simply assigned at 
residence with their passport confiscated by rebels as they await judicial 
review while others managed to flee the country to neighbouring Tunis or 
Cairo. 
“They issued their decision without even interrogating me, accusing me 
of being the enemy of the revolution of 17 February. I knew about the 
decision in a communique published by the press forbidding me from 
working in official positions. I went to court and won a ruling in my favour 
abrogating the committee’s decision. They appealed the ruling before the 
higher court. I am waiting now for the decision of the higher court. They 
are simply replicating the experience of the information bureau (the central 
information apparatus) of Gaddafi.” 
—Former leading media figure interviewed under confidentiality 
After the fall of the regime, I gathered my former team of al-Shams 
newspaper to discuss publishing a new newspaper with a new discourse. In 
the middle of the meeting, three armed persons stormed the room and took 
me away. They interrogated me and insulted me. I finally managed to talk 
to their leader who appeared to be wiser. They let me go after they took 
my passport. After a week, I managed to contact their leader who finally 
accepted to give me back my passport. 
—Abdel Hakim Maatouk, 
former editor-in-chief of al-Shams state-owned newspaper
If the leading figures of the old media guard are excluded from participating 
in its restructuring—by prosecution or intimidation—the mid to junior staff 
of the former state media are also reluctant to resume work. Many factors 
76. See http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=12411&article=705163
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are behind this reluctance for journalists to resume activity. For one, the 
transitional power lacks authority. In addition, journalists maintain status 
as salaried employees whether or not they show up for work. But most 
importantly, the new media environment does not seem attractive to 
journalists; most of the new state-funded press publications were established 
without a clear vision. The internal structures of these institutions are very 
fluid and struggling to develop into a modern and functional one. In addition 
to the problem of insecurity and the lack of any protection for journalists, the 
clash between the journalists and newcomers (i.e. former citizen journalists) 
proves to be a major obstacle.
“The work environment is tricky. I work according to my mood. The 
country is in total chaos and the newspapers have internal problems. 
In my newspaper, there is dispute over its identity. It was first launched 
in Benghazi and then moved to Tripoli. The Ministry of Culture is 
supporting the Tripoli branch but staff in Benghazi are claiming ownership 
of the newspaper. Some journalists have been arrested and beaten; you 
don’t know who your enemy is and who your friend is. There is no one to 
protect us.”
—Warda Mohamed, reporter, Libya newspaper 
“The revolution brought us a new wave of journalists who have no link to 
the industry. We find ourselves invaded by thousands who pretend to have 
worked in media during the revolution—although we never heard of them. 
The real journalists are at home. The newcomers took over using their 
revolutionary connections…”
—Mariyam al Hajjaji, head of al-Libiyya FM radio 
Although negatively portrayed by Libyan audiences as the conveyer of regime 
propaganda, these mainstream journalists from the old state media played a 
“revolutionary” role during the rebellion and contributed to the weakening of 
state media propagation: by boycotting their workplace, they referred to their 
actions as a form of civil disobedience. Most of those interviewed said they 
contributed to the revolution by providing regional satellite TV channels, 
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such as al-Arabiya and Al Jazeera, with information about the internal 
developments of the rebellion and the regime’s reactions and operations. 
This information was invaluable for Arab channels that proved to be strong 
voices for the rebellion.
So, who are the journalists of post-Gaddafi Libya? This remains a difficult 
question. For the new media community formed mostly of young newcomers 
and former citizen journalists, there were no real journalists under Gaddafi 
as those who used to work in state media were simply the mouthpiece of the 
regime. Broaching the topic of professional journalism before the revolution, 
is usually met with a sarcastic smile: which media are you referring to? For 
those who used to work under the former media regime the newcomers are 
invading the industry, contributing to the endemic problems of mainstream 
media and lowering the pre-existing poor quality of journalism. For these 
old-school journalists, an ordinary citizen cannot be fast-tracked into a 
professional journalist. However, it is evident that former citizen journalists 
and young newcomers are the most enthusiastic to be integrated into the 
new Libyan media landscape. This means they are also the most welcome 
by the industry, regardless of their competence or training. Some of them 
have attended training courses but in most cases, they are trained in practice 
inside the media outlet with quick development from amateur to professional 
standards expected. 
I was met with various examples of young presenters who were given their 
first on-air programme without any previous training or knowledge of the 
broadcasting industry. For instance one of the presenters of the morning TV 
show at al-Wataniya station (“good morning Libya”) is a lawyer who works 
on a volunteer basis because she “likes the job.”77 Private media are reluctant 
to provide jobs for staff of former state media and instead opt to recruit new 
talent who must learn on the job. This is especially so for TV presenters; 
engaging well-known media figures from the Gaddafi era is strictly prohibited. 
77. Interview with author, Tripoli, October 2012.
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“Libya is the only country where a journalist is liable for writing an opinion 
article. A journalist can flatter someone today and criticise them tomorrow. 
Journalists are free to change their positions. Unfortunately, today there is 
an awful trend for exclusion. This is leading to impoverishment of all the 
industries from qualified professionals.”
—Mohamed Baio, former head of the General Press Corporation
“We tried to engage journalists from the former media. They could not 
work at our rhythm; they are still working under the mentality of the state 
media where they consider themselves to be employees. I told them they 
have to work or they will be fired.”
—Mahmoud el Misrati, 
owner and editor-in-chief of Libya al-Jadida newspaper
Chapter Recommendations
 The continuous divide between old and new, pro-revolution and pro-
regime, is contributing to the major problem of the Libyan media industry 
and its lack of media skills. The labelling of journalists into competing 
camps is making the reconstruction of the media industry laden with 
politics. A unified media community is crucial for the reconstruction of 
the media industry especially with the endemic lack of national skills. 
 Guaranteeing transparency in media funding is crucial to the ability of 
independent media to thrive and to win the trust of its audience. Any 
regulatory framework should consider funding transparency a major 
requirement for any media project, as well as implementation of fair 
competition laws.
 Training and support programmes for Libyan journalists should include a 
clear vision for planning and managing media projects. Similarly the need 
for new projects to adopt a business model is essential as they are more 
likely to prove to be sustainable and, thus, a successful media project. 
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 It is the responsibility of the government to provide security for journalists 
and to take complete control over former state media assets and 
buildings. However, it is the duty of journalists to voice the abuses and 
intimidations they are victim to and lobby for their security and rights. 
It is crucial to empower the media community to lobby for their rights 
in the political and public arenas nationally and internationally through 
building nets of pressure groups from within this community. This is one 
of the main fields of intervention for international agents working on 
media development in the country. 
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Conclusion
Media transition in Libya has adopted a radical approach: a complete 
rupture from the past. While there is progress in moving away from old 
media practices entrenched in a hegemonic regime, this could be an illusion 
in the case of Libya. The dismantling of former state media institutions has 
led to undue punishment of former media staff, believed complicit in the 
former regime’s oppression, who are now stigmatised and excluded from the 
new Libyan media outlets. This lack of leadership within the new Libyan 
media landscape, a direct result of no institutional knowledge or vision, has 
handicapped the reconstruction of the media industry. This political pressure 
to exclude skilled workers is exacerbating the overall lack of professionalism 
and skills development, a long-standing problem in Libyan media. 
The management of the media transition was volatile and completely 
lacked long term vision. It was generally managed by officials who had no 
expertise in media newsrooms. This is understandable in view of the lack 
of leadership skills, most of them accused of having been part of the former 
regime. Experienced Libyan journalists living and working abroad are also 
unwelcome, considered as outsiders to the local media industry. 
The management of the media transition brought major problems, 
compounding the poor legacy of the former regime’s media landscape. The 
current power struggle over controlling the state media has plunged the 
industry into turmoil. It has led to further fragmentation of this media sector 
for long time mistrusted by the Libyan audiences. 
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New media projects launched with state funds are unsustainable and lack 
newsroom structure while the newly-flourishing private media sector is 
chaotic. The absence of transparent funding models and questionable 
operating standards has replicated the larger media discourse inherent to the 
Gaddafi era. 
Libyan media’s deficiencies are vast and cover all facets of production. 
For one, the media industry’s decades-long isolation from the Arab and 
international markets poses a particular challenge to its reconstruction by 
comparison to the transitional media industries in Egypt and Tunisia. Media 
reform in Libya therefore requires tailor-made solutions that can address the 
specific needs of the national mainstream industry. 
While most training available to media staff with little professional experience 
focusses on basic media practices, it is crucial that these courses provide 
programmes that are targeting media practitioners of different media platforms 
(print, magazine, television and radio) as well as different levels of media 
professionalism (junior reporters as well as senior managers). This process 
should be based on a deeper understanding of the needs and challenges facing 
the media industry. It is a must that these programmes target institutions 
and contribute to their development towards professionalism. In doing so, 
international and regional agents working in media development should base 
their operations on a deep understanding of the media industry, its needs 
and its challenges—a matter that necessitates direct connections with this 
industry. It is clear that most of the training programmes had targeted citizen 
journalists recruiting trainees through local centres. They must now focus 
on media institutions and therefore target their staff with specific training 
programmes. 
Moreover, in order to bear its fruit this training should be sustainable, tailored 
to the realities of newsrooms and embracing elements of long-term coaching/
mentoring for journalists and their media institutions. 
The media reconstruction process is strongly linked to the political 
reconstruction of post-Gaddafi Libya. The political transition is progressing 
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slowly and painfully while tribal tensions are impacting media culture. If 
independent media is a main pillar in state building, Libya’s budding media 
industry is still searching for its role in a complex political climate. Whereas 
the new Libyan media is finally able to question and thoroughly investigate 
political actors, its ability to act as a catalyst for the democratisation process 
is hindered by its structural shortcomings. A strengthened media would be a 
vital player in the state rebuilding process as well as the consolidation of the 
fragile post-Gaddafi security and national reconciliation. 
National traditional media in Libya is generally perceived as a political tool 
that is able to contribute to the stabilisation of the new democratic regime 
while equally exacerbating historical tribal frictions via hate speech; the 
national media is routinely accused of spearheading “national dissension” 
through campaigns of political or tribal incitement and its treatment of 
unconfirmed rumours. However, this situation is often used as a ploy to 
muzzle the new Libyan media in their attempts to uncover abuses and to 
tackle controversial topics. This is leading to a situation where media is 
not able to tackle polemic national issues under the banner of the need to 
safeguard national unity. If journalists’ training is crucial, media literacy 
programmes are equally important to remedy the inability of both audiences 
and the new political sphere to comprehend the nature of media and its role 
in consolidating democratic systems. 
Today, Libyan journalists are not free. While the fall of the Gaddafi regime 
liberated journalists from their role as publishers of state propaganda, implicit 
red lines—such as militias, arms and religion—have now pushed journalists to 
self-censor and obstruct media operations in the name of their own personal 
security. A brief period of press freedom at the regime’s downfall meant a 
steep rise in investigative reports on endemic issues at the heart of Libya, 
such as prison torture, rape and the supremacy of militia rule. This trend 
is now in regression due to the growing pressures and dangers surrounding 
investigative journalism. Debating current events and political agendas 
through lengthy talk shows looks like a safer choice for media outlets. 
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In the post-Gaddafi era, journalists are threatened, intimidated and attacked; 
the menace posed by the former regime’s security apparatus has simply been 
replaced by that of armed groups and militias. While these groups have 
been held responsible for human rights abuses, their growing hegemony is 
nonetheless a major threat to the state’s authority. 
It is the responsibility of the Libyan government to provide a secure 
environment for media to operate and to flourish. It is also the government’s 
responsibility to safeguard the assets of state-funded media and to liberate it 
from the dominance of armed groups. However, it is the responsibility of the 
media community to voice abuses and to lobby internally and internationally to 
secure rights and safety. The fragmentation of the national media community 
and the absence of a unifying body that represents its interests have further 
weakened its ability to lobby for a secure and professional work environment. 
A more apt media community would suggest a greater awareness of the nature 
of its role, especially considering the lack of professional independence under 
the former regime.
The testimony of Mohamed al Saghir summarises so perfectly the plight of 
Libyan journalists. Al Saghir, a former state media journalist, was arrested 
and tortured after he voiced his opposition to the Gaddafi regime on Al 
Jazeera during the revolution. With the liberation of the country, al Saghir 
thought that he could finally work free of fear. However, he has since 
been arrested and interrogated twice by former rebels after reporting on 
controversial topics such as the bombing of religious shrines. “Before we had 
one Gaddafi,” al Saghir lamented. “Today we have hundreds of Gaddafis.” In 
a post-Gaddafi Libya, professional journalism has proven itself to be a mirror 
reflecting its past. There remains a long journey to achieve professional and 
unbiased media. 
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Major Highlights 
 Skills and Professionalism: The lack of national skills, especially 
at the leadership level, was a major handicap of the national Libyan 
media industry. This is further exacerbated by the inability of the old 
state media staff to integrate into the new media institution, mostly 
under intimidation. Libyan journalists are struggling to move beyond 
the entrenched traditions of glorifying the “leader.” If adopting a newsy 
format appears to be an achievable target for these journalists, more 
sophisticated media genres such as investigative journalism and field 
reporting is still lacking in newsroom practices Major obstacles are the 
lack of security and legal protection for journalists as well as the inability 
of audiences and the new political sphere to tolerate an open media 
debate
 
 Media and the New Political Sphere: Journalists are finally able to 
question the new political actors moving beyond the role of simple 
conveyer of the regime’s message. They are liberated from the outdated 
news formats laden with the redundant discourse of glorification. 
However, this identity change is hindered by politicians attempting to 
use the same censorship/intimidation tools of the former regime and the 
growing tribal tensions which obstruct field reporting in regional areas. 
The flourishing of Facebook as a news source is impacting both the 
political reporting of media staff as well as the official political agenda 
itself. 
 Media Policy: Specialised expertise is needed to lead the thorny process 
of the reconstruction of former state media and the drafting of laws for 
the private sector. This body of experts should be granted executive 
power and should enjoy both international expertise and the knowledge 
of the local media industry. Approaching this process as a reward for 
those who were supportive of the revolution has led to a chaotic media 
transition lacking long term vision.
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 Training: Journalism training is still volatile, focussing on short 
term formats and not tailored to answer the specific problems of the 
local media industry. For this training to be efficient, it has to evolve 
towards a coaching system and to address different needs for different 
media platforms. It has to target junior journalists as well as leaders and 
managers. Providing managers with viable business models is crucial in 
supporting the sustainability of newfound media projects. 
 Media Institutions: Libyan journalists operate without the support of 
professional and solid institutions that could provide them with adequate 
production tools. Establishing new institutional structures and newsroom 
dynamics as well as new editorial decision-making processes are crucial to 
move towards professional and viable institutions. Most of the new media 
institutions are operating according to former dynamics where the head 
of the media outlet has a monopoly over the editorial decision making 
processes. Few media outlets managed to adopt internal structures 
in which roles and responsibilities are defined clearly. Media training/
coaching should contribute to consolidating these new trends. 
 State media: An open debate about the future role of state media in the 
post-Gaddafi era has yet to be launched among journalists and in the 
public arena. This is vital to the fate of this media industry. The volatile 
management of this sector under the transition has led to continuous 
changes, exacerbating its long standing problems and providing its 
journalists with a fragile work environment. A long term vision is much 
needed to define a professional function for this sector and its journalists 
beyond the simple role of conveying the message of the regimes. It is the 
 responsibility of the government to launch this process and to put an end 
to the power struggles endemic to this media sector.
 Reporting under militias: Libyan journalists are subject to different 
forms of direct and indirect threats from militias and former rebels 
groups whose power is posing a real threat to the state building process 
in the new Libya. This pressure—expressed in some cases of attack—is 
reducing journalists to self-censorship by fear of retaliation. This situation 
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is leading to implicit new red lines forcing journalists to avoid tackling 
controversial topics—religion and militias’ arms especially—and to focus 
their production on reporting the new political system. Investigative 
journalism and field reporting are the most challenging media genres for 
newsrooms under the precarious security situation. 
 Media Funding and Transparency: The private media sector flourished 
for the first time in the history of the Libyan media industry. However, 
hundreds of new media outlets were launched without clarity on their 
funding and with questionable production standards replicating, in 
some cases, the old media regime practices. Guaranteeing transparency 
in media funding is essential to safeguard the independence of new 
media from political agendas. Any regulatory framework should consider 
funding transparency a major requirement for any media project, as well 
as implementation of fair competition laws.
 Journalist awareness: Libyan journalists are paying high prices to do 
their job. They are operating without the protection of a professional 
media environment and adequate regulations. They are facing audience 
rejection, the pressure of the new political power and the intimidations 
of former rebels and militias. However, it is for journalists to protect 
their fragile, newfound freedom by resisting external control and self-
censorship. This requires continuous coaching to maintain awareness 
about the nature of their role as journalists. The support of international 
experts is also required to establish representative groups and lobbying 
tools enabling journalists to fight for their right as a unified community. 
The undue labelling of journalists into competing camps has hindered 
this process.
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